The formalization of the issue of Kosovo’s independence as an autonomous state has entered its final stage. This act will not only change the region’s geopolitics but will also permanently determine the future of the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian people. For months now, the Macedonian government, including the media, has placed emphasis on some quite second-grade issues and I could not find an analysis which explained what would happen to Macedonia after the establishment of the new state on the northern border. We can’t help but simply marvel at the ability of the called upon – both from the government and the opposition – to engage in marginal affairs at the most crucial moments! So I will attempt to present to you my answer to the question what to expect after Kosovo’s recognition.

The first scenario is if the Russians decide, after all, to give up their right to veto! Then Kosovo will be a state of a widespread international recognition. In this case it is clear that, figuratively speaking, a “honey moon” will set in during which Kosovars’ priority will be the expatriation of the resident Serbs. This period will last from 3 to 5 years, and then eventually we’ll become witness to the final blow against the Republic of Macedonia – its transformation into a third Albanian republic.

The second scenario will be relevant in case Russia uses its veto. Then most probably there will be a self-proclamation of an independent Kosovo, recognition of its independence by the international community, a secession of the Serb-populated municipalities from Kosovo, all this undoubtedly leading to a long-term destabilization of the region. It is possible that in a year’s time Kosovars will attempt to overtake Serbian municipalities – peacefully, or instigating different incidents, so that if all attempts fail they could quickly declare they have the necessary legitimacy to impose their own will in the region, thus exporting the crisis to Southern Serbia, Macedonia, and maybe even to Montenegro, and proclaiming some autonomies, federations or even independence. Albanian municipalities in Macedonia could undertake such actions any moment now. And this is quite obvious because the Macedonian state no longer has the power to even try to oppose such a process. Neither do we have any chance of receiving the support of the international community in this matter. On the contrary, the moment such a thing happens we’ll be sent a message accusing the Macedonian government it was its own fault it didn’t fully implement the Ohrid Agreement.

It follows then that regardless whether it is the first or second scenario that comes into effect, I think it will be our country that pays the price. So, I ask this, “Is there an option directly corresponding to Macedonia’s interests and as close as possible to a principled fair decision which would lead to a long-term stability on the Balkans?” I will once again repeat the idea I promoted about four years ago and I have to stress that all events are already happening in the sequence I then predicted. I still believe there is a way to put an end to the lasting destabilization on the Balkans and the total regional economic catastrophe.
Firstly, it is not at all possible to seek a solution about Kosovo as an isolated case on the Balkans. It is complete delusion to believe that due to the obscurity of problems in other parts of the region the recognition of Kosovo’s independence will solve everything. Let me point out that there are currently two Croat states on the Balkans, two Serb states, two and a half Albanian states; three protectorates: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, and three major agreements, which more resemble cease-fire agreements than long-term solutions: the Dayton Agreement, the Kumanovo Agreement and the Ohrid Agreement.

Delusive is a decision only about Kosovo without the final resolution of the other hot issues which will arise under the domino effect. That is why four years ago I said that the Balkans need to hold a new Balkan conference, of course, under the auspice of the USA, the EU and Russia, with the participation of all the Balkan states. The purpose of the conference should be the final resolution of all existing problems along the following lines: Albanians should be given the opportunity to establish a Great Albania which would include parts of Kosovo, excluding Serbian enclaves which will remain in Serbia; Serbs, on the other hand, residing in Kosovo, should exchange their property for property in Bujanovac and Presevo. Serbia will thus free itself from the Albanian problem, while Kosovo will of the Serbian. Macedonia should make a demarcation and Albanians should receive Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar with an additional swap of Macedonian and Albanian population. Albanians will be territorially compensated, while Macedonia will get its only chance of salvation and survival in its own state. And if Montenegrins are wise enough, they can in due time unconditionally give Albanians Plav and Gusinje.

I would like to stress that any procrastination in establishing a Great Albania is prolongation of the agony and destabilization until the final fulfillment of this goal. Here I will also focus on the thesis considered the strongest argument of Ahtisaari’s plan. Namely, independent Kosovo will not join Albania?! My position is fundamentally opposite! The creation of an independent Kosovo with great influence on the hardline Islamic Albanian fanatics in Kosovo, Western Macedonia, Southern Serbia and Montenegro is an investment similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. At a moment when the matter of choice should be brought to the fore, Europe will most severely feel the establishment of this base of Islamic fundamentalism. On the contrary, Great Albania is not only a national solution but also a chance for Tirana to be actively involved in the Europeanization of the other parts.

In addition, I’d like to also mention Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is quite clear that as a state it doesn’t function. A possible solution in this case could be to allow Serbs to join the Serbian part to Serbia, the Croat part to go to Croatia, and the Bosnian part to become and independent state which would also receive certain territorial compensations, for example Srebrenica as a symbol.

In conclusion, I’d like to once more unequivocally stress that the multiethnic approach to the solution of the complex problems on the Balkans has already irretrievably failed! Such a principle can be only introduced artificially. The only long-lasting solution is all problems to be laid out at a pan-Balkan conference implementing the only enduring model – the ethnic principle.